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1. Introduction
Within the euro area, electronic money currently is relatively intensely used in the Netherlands. The
advent of software-based electronic money instruments has spurred research (see, among others,
Boeschoten and Hebbink,  1996; Visser, 1996; Groeneveld and Visser, 1997) investigating the
monetary policy implications of these technological innovations on the retail  side of the payments
system. This research points to a gradual substitution of currency by its electronic counterpart
(currently mostly multi-purpose prepaid cards).  As currency by itself is neither a useful operational or
intermediate target nor a relevant Channel of transmission of monetary policy, this type of financial
innovation is unlikely to inhibit, in any substantial way, the formulation of monetary policy (Henckel
et al., 1999). Indeed,  recent work by the European Central Bank (ECB, 2000b) seems to take the same
position.
However,  innovations influencing the wholesale side of the payments system, both in gross
and in net clearing systems, suggest the possibility of a less benign outlook for the monetary policy
maker. The main reason for this is that these innovations affect the demand for reserves by financial
intermediaries, which is at the core  of the monetary transmission mechanism in modem economies.
This manifestation of the development of e-money may diminish the need for bank reserves at the
central bank. It thus has (in the absente  of regulatory measures) the potential of eliminating the
monopoly position of centra1 banks as suppliers of the means of payment (Woodford, 2000), with
negative consequences for the ability of central banks to conduct monetary policy.
The evolution of electronic means of payment is but one of the manifestations of ‘New
Economy’-type of developments directly impacting on the centra1 bank and monetary policy in
particular. Advances  in information technology also influence the structure  of (financial) markets,  the
(financial) behaviour of economie  agents and the types of (financial) products  traded; that is the entire
monetary transmission mechanism.  For example, advances in data processing and the easier access  to
information erode the comparative  advantage of banks as intermediaries in an environment
characterised by information asymmetries. New financial products  such as securitised assets  are a
proliferation of non-bank credit. Households and firms  increasingly turn directly to financial markets
when making spending decisions. Moreover, the IT revolution enables the creation of new clearing
mechanisms which can compete with the centra1 banking settlement systems (King. 1999).
This paper is one of the first attempts to put together all these developments and provide a
coherent discussion of the probable effects  of the new economy on the monetary transmission
mechanism.To this end we fust discuss,  in the next section,  the concept of ‘new economy’.  A similar
conceptual discussion, related to the transmission mechanism, is the subject of section 3. We disect  the
transmission process  in a number of stages, which are dealt with, respectively, in sections 4 to 6.
Section 7 concludes.
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2 New Economv-concentual issues
Defining the concept ‘New Economy’ is a daunting task; in fact,  nobody has yet provided a precise
defïnition. Most of the macroeconomic discussions to date seem to relate  the new economy to a
permanent rise in either the leve1 or the growth rate of potential output, with an increase in the growth
rate of trend productivity being the main component of this increase in growth (see, for example,
Bullard and Schaling,  2000). The new economy would also seem to be characterised by a reduction in
structural and frictional unemployment. What therefore appears to be meant by the new economy is
that the speed limits of the economy have been increased, that is the new economy can operate  at
higher  rates of growth than in the past without generating an acceleration in inflation (Jorgenson and
Stiroh, 2000). Most of the current literature (see, for example, Oliner and Sichel,  2000, OECD, 2000
and European Union,  2000) then proceeds by examining whether the existente  of a new economy can
be detected empirically. The latter  is not clear-cut, especially in Europe (ECB, 2000a).
The task we set ourselves to achieve in this paper is somewhat different, however.
Specifïcally,  we seek to analyse the possible effects  of the new economy on the monetary transmission
mechanism,  a concept which we wil1 define shortly. In doing so, we take as a starting point the
existente  of a new economy. The description of the new economy as given above is not very  useful
for our purposes, since we need to relate  the new economy to the entire process  of monetary
transmission, instead of just to the final part in the chain, that is inflation and growth. We therefore
proceed by identifying the main variables which theory would suggest are plausible candidates  as
driving forces  of the new economy, see, e.g. Buiter  (2000)  In this respect, most attention has tended to
be focused on the effects  of an acceleration in the diffusion of the dramatic  advances  in information
and communication technologies,  or ICT. Meijers (2000) for example shows analytically how  the
diffusion of ICT across  the economy can account for some of the recently observed empirical
phenomena, see also Gordon (2000). However, despite its unquestionable importante.  the driving
forces  of the new economy go beyond just the ICT revolution (Cecchetti, 2000; Wadhwani. 2000). In
this respect, the following indicators are also relevant, as they are usually  seen as catalysts for the
effects  on inflation and output which are relevant in a new economy context. They include innovations
in the field of the development and use of financial products,  including risk management techniques;
domestic financial market liberalisation and the globalisation of these markets; the globalisation of
trade in goods and services; increasing labour market flexibility; increased product market
competition, and improved macro-economie management (ie a credible preferente  for price stability
and reduction of budget deficits).
By focusing on these phenomena, it becomes clear that the new economy is in fact  not
something new’. Some of these factors,  such as financial market liberalisation and globalisation,
already have a fairly long history, see, for example. Bordo, Eichengreen and Kim (1998). and Bordo.
’ For similar views, see for instance  Bartelsman and Hinlopen (2000). Hessius (2000). Plosser (2000). Every time an
economy has undergone significant structural changes,  it has been regarded as a new economy. As early as in the
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Eichengreen and Irwin (1999). We view the new economy as a dynamic process which results from an
interaction * of al1 these factors, the end result  of which could be that the speed limits of the economy
are raised. We are interested in analysing the consequences of this process for the monetary
transmission mechanism. It is to a description of the latter  to which we now turn.
3 Monetarv transmission mechanism
The monetary transmission mechanism consists of several channels, al1 of them interlinked and each of
them comprising of several stages, see Berk (2001). Centra1 to these different views are altemative
conceptions regarding important structural and institutional factors, more specifically  the functioning of
credit, labour and product markets.  As wil1 be discussed in detail below, the above-mentioned factors
associated with the new economy wil1 impact on the channels of the monetary transmission mechanism
by affecting the functioning of markets.  We should note at the outset, however,  that no attempt is made
to rank (the strength of the) different transmission channels, as our primary focus wil1 be on analysing
the impact of the new economy on each Channel.
To illustrate the working of the monetary transmission mechanism and the role of these factors it
is useful, for presentational purposes, to highlight the following elements.3  First, the influence of changes
in the instrument variables on the tost  of finance. Second,  the influence of changes in the tost  of finance
on expenditure decisions of private-sector agents, i.e. on non-financial activity. The latter  is defined to
include inflation and real economie activity. Third, the pass-through of changes in non-financial activity
to output and inflation. Underlying this division of the transmission mechanism into separate stages is
the conception that markets  do not necessarily clear  instantaneously. If, on the other hand, al1 markets
did always clear, the transmission mechanism would be fairly trivial. A change in the instrument variable
would immediately lead to a compensating change in the price level, without having consequences for
output. The classica1 dichotomy would be maintained.4 This is not to say that the new economy could
not, by increasing the availability of information and reducing transaction costs,  be interpreted as a move
towards the textbook model of perfect competition (McTeer,  2000). As wil1 be further discussed in
section 6 below, it could be argued that, if one were to extrapolate the factors mentioned in the previous
section  ad injìnitum, the result would closely resemble the perfect competition paradigm. However,
while conceivable enough from a theoretical point of view, the prospects  for this paradigm of coming
1960’s.  Kahn and Wiener (1967) discussed the emergence of a new economy in the context of the spread of ICT.
’ For example, information technology, financial innovation and globalisation are intimately hnked. By reducing the
tost of communications. ICT has helped to globalise product and capita1  markets.  In turn, globalisation spurs
competition and therefore innovation, and speeds up the  diffusion of new technology through trade and investment.
For details on the various interactions, see, for example, Buiter  (2000) and Sijben (2000).
’ The transmission mechanism is a dynamic process, in that it represents a sequence of events taking place  at
successive  moments in time. The ordering below reflects the timing of this sequence.
4 This line of reasoning implicitly follows traditional real  business cycle theory (Kydland and Prescott, 1982).
However, the assumption of market clearing does not necessarily imply a trivial  transmission mechanism.
Counterexamples are the stochastic general  equilibrium models which incorporate money, for example within the
cash-in-advance framework (Cooley and Hansen, 1995). For a critical analysis  of the Iatter framework. see Bengtsson
(2000a). Even more interesting from the point of view of the new economy, Woodford (1998) shows analytically that
it is possible to analyse equilibrium inflation determination without any reference to money.
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into reality in the foreseeable future can be put into question. The main part of our analysis wil1 therefore
be devoted to an investigation not of the end result of the new economy, but on the process  towards it
and of the most likely implications for the various transmission channels  of monetary policy.
4 The influence of changes in the instrument variable on the tost of finance
The presumption underlying this stage is that there exists a mechanism that links the purely financial
operations of the centra1 bank to the non-financial decisions made by economie  agents. More
specifically, it is assumed that the monetary authority exercises power over economie  behaviour of
private-sector agents by influencing the financial (opportunity) tost  relevant to the spending decisions of
these agents. The typical operational target used by centra1 banks is the ovemight rate,  which it broadly
determines through its monopoly control, notably by open market operations, of the monetary base, ie
the currency outstanding and the deposits held with centra1 banks  by commercial banks (Crockett, 1994;
Mishkin, 1996). According to BIS (1994),  the pass-through from these ovemight rates  to short-term
market interest rates is fairly complete in most industrialised countries. The centra1 bank therefore is able
to control the short-term market interest rate.  Although this position is currently relatively unchallenged
(see also Bemanke and Blinder, 1992; Mauskopf, 1990),  the question arises how  the new economy
impacts on this centra1 bank control of the ovemight rate.  Put differently, what are the consequences of
the new economy for the influence the centra1 bank currently has on the monetary base. Moreover, if that
influence would disappear, is the centra1 bank stil1 able to control short-term interest rates? We wil1
discuss  these issues in turn.
Centra1 bank injluence on the monetary base
The most visible advance in KT with a possible impact on (the relevante  of) central bank influence on
the monetary base pertains to the development of convenient ways of executing payments electronically
that might in the past have required the use of centra1 bank issued currency. These electronic innovations
often  have been loosely labelled by the term electronic money. or e-money. Although the medium-of-
exchange function probably is the most important in a discussion of electronic currency substitutes (Ely,
1997; England, 1997; Berentsen. 1998; ECB, 2OOOb),  it is important for what fellows to note that money
performs more roles than facilitating transactions. Indeed,  defining the concept of money is by no means
an easy task (see Dalziel.  2000, for a comprehensive survey and Bengtsson, 2OOOa.  2000b for a
theoretical analysis). and the same holds for its electronic variant. Standard economie textbooks attribute
to it three characteristic functions: medium of exchange, a store of value and unit of account. The legal
defïnition of electronic  money as currently prevailing in Europe for instance reflects most of these
functions.5
’ According to article 1 of the European Parliament and Council Directive 2000/46/EC,  ‘electronic money shall  mean
monetary value as represented by a claim on the issuer which is (i) stored on an electronic  device:  (ii)  issued on receipt
of funds of an amount not less in value than  the monetary value issued.  (iii) accepted  as means  of payment by
undertakings other than the user’.
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It is convenient  for what follows to distinguish between three classes of electronic means of
payment, ie e-transfers, e-purses and e-money proper (White, 1997; Lelieveldt et al., 2000). E-transfers
are defïned as transfers which are not based on paper as a source document (an example of the lattter
would be checks). A subset  of e-transfers is e-purses, the most prominent example of which are multi-
purpose stored value cards or smart cards which fïgure  prominently in European countries and Japan.6
Value transferred from payer to payee via e-purses can not, in general,  be used again, but has to be
forwarded to the issuer for redemption. E-purses that allow for the direct transfer of credit balances from
purse to purse, without the immediate involvement of the issuing (financial) institution, fa11 into the
category of e-money proper.
While al1 of these concepts  initiate an electronic transfer of value between two transaction
accounts,  only balances of e-money proper are circulating bearer media. When issued by private parties,
they can be considered to fullfill  a full-fledged medium of exchange role which has the potential to
evolve to a substitute for centra1 bank currency.’  A balance of e-money proper represents a floating claim
on the issuer that is not linked to any particular account (White, 1997). To the extent that the issuer is not
a centra1 bank, there wil1 be a transfer of seigniorage from the centra1 bank to the private (financial)
institution issuing e-money (Groeneveld and Visser, 1997; Berentsen, 1998).*  If e-money proper
becomes so entrenched in the preferences of economie agents (for example, when  it
completely dominates altematives in terms of convenience and low tost; Rahn, 2000),  it could replace
not only centra1 bank currency but also traditional bank demand deposits and other types of highly liquid
deposits.’ If this leads to a situation in which the claims that people exchange in order to execute
transactions are no longer claims on the books of banks (or are no longer backed one for one by bank
deposits), problems for the efficacy of monetary policy could arise as the connection between the change
in reservable bank deposits and the change in non-financial activity wil1 be weakened (Gilbert, 1997).
There are, however,  (regulatory or institutional) ways to get around this problem. Examples include
extending the reserve requirements to ah entities in the business of issuing these claims or requiring tax
payments to be made using claims backed by bank deposits (Jordan and Stevens, 1997; Goodhart, 2000).
The regulatory path seems to be favoured in Europe, see ECB (2OOOb),  whereas the US seems to follow
a more liberal attitude in this respect (Greenspan, 1997).
6 Examples of e-transfers not belonging to e-purses include access  products,  such  as debit cards, credit cards, ATM‘s.
and home banking, in which payments are settled by way of transfers between bank accounts,  and payment
instruments as pre-paid telephone cards, which are accepted  as payment only by their issuer.
’ In addition, if ICT were to significantly reduce  the demand for currency by the general  public, the depository
institutions’ derived demand for vault  cash would also  diminish. For an analysis of vault  cash, see Bennett and
Peristiani (2001).
* Today, almost  ah  proposed e-money schemes  are developed by private institutions. The issuer, however,  could also
be a centra1 bank.
’ E-money is characterised by relatively high fixed costs,  due to the need to rely on new technologies.  but low
marginal costs,  as the tost of processing a single transaction is very  small.  This makes  e-money especially suitable for
making frequent and smal1  payments. Moreover, it is likely that there wil1  be a network effect. That is, once  a critical
mass is reached, a new payment instrument develops more quickly because its usefulness is an increasing function of
the number of individuals who use it in executing transactions. Finally. the hkelihood of e-money becoming a substitute
for bank deposits would increase were e-money to be remunerated.
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However, the development of e-money proper is as yet mainly a theoretical concept” and not a
practica1 reality (BIS, 1996a). Moreover, it is unlikely that ICT wil1 have the potential to completely
eliminate the demand for centra1 bank issued currency, owing, among other things, to the uniquely
convenient  features as a means of payment”  of centra1 bank currency as wel1 as its status of being legal
tender (Goodhart, 2CMN).  But even a significant reduction in the demand for centra1 bank issued currency
might not necessarily pose a problem for the centra1 bank. First, it is wel1 known that it is not the size of
the centra1 bank balance sheet that matters in this respect, see Tobin and Brainard (1963). What matters
is that changes in the size of the centra1 bank balance sheet, or the interest rate the centra1 bank can set,
are at the margin related to changes in the volume and price of assets  and liabilities that the public needs
to engage in economie  activity (Friedman, 2OOOa).  Since centra1 bank issued currency by convention (but
not by necessity, see Goodhart, 1993) eams no interest, the issue thus is how  closely the expansion or
contraction of the remaining activities requiring centra1 bank currency matches the expansion or
contraction of the overall economy that the centra1 bank seeks to
influence.” Second,  central banks usually passively accomodate currency demand, in stead of trying to
fix its supply (Ely, 1997; Freedman, 2000). That is, as centra1 bank issued currency is probably not very
relevant in monetary policy implementation, its demise, if this ever happens,  is also unlikely to be
important.
Currency is but one of the components of base money. We therefore now turn to a discussion of
the effect of the new economy on the demand for centra1 bank deposits by depository institutions. These
institutions hold an account balance with the centra1 bank mainly to satisfy reserve requirements and for
use as settlement balances. Consider first  reserve requirements. The introduction of the so-called sweep
accounts  in the US illustrates  the relevante  of the new economy,  via the introduction of faster
information processing, for central banks. It gives an impetus to innovations that facilitate the transfer of
funds by depository institutions between their accounts  not subject to reserve requirements and the
balances that are, thereby allowing payments to be made while maintaining low average balances subject
to the reserve requirements (White. 2000). This type of behaviour can of course be countered by new
regulation. However, the long-term success  of the regulator in the ensuing regulatory rat race can be
called into question when  the regulations are not suffíciently market-oriented (Browne and Cronin.
1997). For statutory reserve requirements that compel a depository institution to hold reserves it can not
use or that pay subcompetitive interest rates  act as an implicit  tax, which innovators wil1 always have an
” The proiiferation of various privately issued e-monies implies multiple media of exchange, stores of value, and, in
principle, units of account (on the latter,  see however  Bengtsson, 2000a).  Regulation can  preserve the current
uniqueness of the unit of account function performed by central  bank issued money, for example by imposing a
redeemability requirement on issuers of e-money (ECB, 2000b). For a theoretical rationale, see Issing (1999). The cos1
structure  of e-money, characterised by high fixed and low marginal tost,  however  deters such  a proliferation. In fact,
as indicated by Shapiro and Varian (1999). it introduces  a tendency towards a natura1  monopoly (‘winner takes all’).
” Currency is. for example, completely anonymous. and is less prone to loss.  theft and counterfeiting than  electronic
transfers (Ely,  1997; Kabelac. 1999). It moreover  provides  finality in settlement.
” Note that,  since central  bank-issued currency eams  no interest. it is at a competitive  disadvantage to private issuers of e-
money who  do offer remuneration for holding e-money balances. This of course touches on the free banking issue, see,
for example. Black (1970); Hayek (1976. 1978); White (1984, 1989). Goodhart (1986, 1989) and Issing (1999) provide  a
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incentive to circumvent. The notion that regulators can permanently swim against the tide of innovation
is criticised by Friedman ( 1999).r3  The worldwide trend towards the elimination of reserve
requirements is also indicative  in this respect.14
In addition to satisfying regulatory requirements, depository institutions also hold reserves at the
centra1 bank in order to pay one another. That is, reserves function as a means of settling interbank
transactions through the centra1 bank’s clearing mechanism. This demand for central-bank settlement
balances is mainly precautionary. Without uncertainty about payment transactions, a depository
institution could plan perfectly ahead and always have the exact amount of reserves necessary. However,
with uncertainty, a depository institution needs to minimise the risk of incurring a penalty over the
market rate when  unable to meet settlement obligations by the end of the day. This generally results in a
positive demand for intraday reserves (Poole, 1968; Baltensperger, 1974). By reducing this uncertainty,
advances in information technology usually associated with new economy impact on the demand for
settlement balances. More specifically, payments system innovations, both in gross and net clearing
systems, have increased the efficiency and safety with which banks clear  and settle interbank
transactions, thereby potentially reducing the demand for intraday reserves (Henckel et al., 1999).15
Moreover, another important factor related to the new economy,  financial market liberalisation and
deregulation, increases the liquidity of securities (BIS, 1998) providing depository institutions with an
important substitute for centra1 bank reserves. Instead of holding settlement balances, banks hold liquid
securities which they can use at any time to borrow the settlement balances that they exactly need to
avoid end-ofday overdrafts in their current account at the centra1 bank.
Although these new economy factors  work towards a reduction of the demand for settlement
balances. it is likely that some residual demand wil1 continue to exist, due to, for example, strategie bank
behaviour or other market imperfections.‘6 Debtor banks may,  for example, be unable to locate a
potential lender in time or lenders may not offer loans at suitable conditions for strategie reasons. When
the marginal creditor bank in the market must negotiate a price at which to lend resources to the marginal
debtor bank. a game situation arises  in which the creditor bank may be tempted to ‘corner’ the debtor
bank (ie adopt non-cooperative behaviour). These arguments point to a reduced, but nonetheless positive,
critical analysis.
l3 Gilbert  (1997) however  seems to reach  a different conclusion.
l4 In most of the countries stil1 using them, the requirements no longer function as an instrument for monetary
control.Their  residual  role in stead is their use as liquidity buffer. Note that in countries which completely abolished
requirements, monetary policy stil1 remains effective (although operating procedures for policy implementation have
changed). See Sellon and Weiner (1996, 1997). and Woodford (200).
l5 Gross  settlement systems have the advantage of ensuring finality, whereas netting systems limit the need for
settlement balances, for which a ‘price’ is paid in terms  of settlement risk. Observance of the Lamfalussy standards
(BIS, 1990), however,  has considerably reduced this risk. On the other hand. sophisticated queueing algorithms, the
provision of collateralised intraday liquidity by central  banks and an efficient  interbank market for central  bank money
have reduced the need for intraday liquidity in gross  settlement systems. Thus, differences between gross  and net
s
2
sterns tend to diminish over time.
It can  be seen from economie history that. even before the nationalisation of clearing and the advent of reserve
requirements, banks held positive reserves (White. 1989)
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demand for settlement balances, which are currently almost exclusively provided by the centra1 bank.”
As in note issue, centra1 banks have taken on this role largely because private providers have been
legally restricted or nationalised (White, 2000). From an economie  point of view, the main comparative
advantage that centra1 banks currently hold over (potential) private competitors pertains to the fact  that
they provide settlement tïnality  as a payment service (Issing, 2000). That is, final settlement represents
an ultimate, official guarantee of values exchanged by depository institutions and their customers (Jordan
and Stevens, 1997).18 However, there are no intrinsic reasons why final settlements could not be carried
out by the private sector without the need for clearing through the centra1 bank.” The practica1
implementation of such a system (a description of which is provided by,
for example, Browne and Fell, 1994 and Browne and Cronin, 1997) would possibly require computers
that communicate  in real time to permit the instantaneous verification of the creditworthiness of
counterparties, which presumably is beyond the computer power that is currently available (King, 1999).
Moreover, the real-time transfer of wealth between electronic  accounts  needed to settle a transaction of
goods or services would probably involve financial assets.  Eligible assets  would include any financial
assets  for which there are market-clearing prices  in real time. This also requires formidable computing
power (in addition to well-functioning and liberahsed financial markets). However, the factors  identified
in section 2 work into the direction of making al1 this available to more private parties at progressively
lower tost. So, new economy induced competition can erode the centra1 bank monopoly in the market
for settlement balances.
Centra1 bank control of short-term rates with substitutes for base money
The new economy thus could, in the limit, lead to a situation in which the demand for settlement
balances is severely reduced, and the position of the centra1 bank in the market for settlement balances is
next to completely marginalised. In combination with a diminished demand for centra1 bank currency,
this could lead to a situation in which centra1 bank liabilities approach zero. Woodford (1998) has shown
that in this ‘cashless limit’ (ie a situation in which there is some, possibly infinite small, demand for
central bank reserves), the price leve1 is stil1 determined, and the centra1 bank is stil1 able to influence
ovemight interest rates  by changing its operational target. What is different, however,  is that in such a
world  the use of quantity-targeting techniques (ie rationing bank reserves) to control interest rates  (such
as currently applied in the US) may become ineffective, especially when the residual demand becomes
highly inelastic or unstable. It may have to be replaced by a more price-oriented system, see also
” This central  bank monopoly is complete in Europe, whereas in the US private clearing mechanisms  exist, such  as the
CHIPS system of the New York Clearing House Association.
” Note the rather  paradoxical fact that the advent of privately issued electronic  purses  (which threaten central  bank
issued currency) for the time being strenghtens the central  bank position in the  market for settlement balances, as final
net settlement of imbalances between these monies will be in the form of central  bank liabilities.
” Freedman (2000). however,  doubts whether the special role of central  banks in providing settlement balances could
ever be replaced, even in the absente of legal  requirements for depository institutions to settle with the central  bank.
His argument hinges  on a priviliged relation between the central  bank and the govemment.Whether this has
consequences for central  bank independente  is an interesting topic for subsequent research.
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Friedman (2000a). Under such a system the centra1 bank operates a borrowing facility at which an
arbitrary quantity of reserves may be borrowed (subject to suitable collateral)  at an announced rate.
Variations in this rate then is the tool by which desired variations in the operational target are achieved.
Beyond this limit lies a true ‘moneyless’ world”  in which e-money proper perfectly substitutes
centra1 bank issued currency, in which fmal settlement could be made without recourse to the centra1
bank, and in which there are no tost  advantages for depository institutions to using central-bank
settlement balances. Even in this economy, sometimes labelled  as ‘fully frictionless’ (Woodford, 2000;
McCallum.  2000; Bengtsson, 2OOOb),  the centra1 bank stil1 has the ability to influence the leve1 of the
ovemight rate,  as long as it is willing  to change the interest rate that it pays on reserves.” Although
currently base money is not remunerated in the US, the remuneration of settlement balances is certainly
not without precedent. In fact,  a number of countries currently pay interest on balances that depository
institutions hold at the centra1 bank, eg. Canada, New Zealand, Austraiia  and the Eurosystem. Indeed,
some of these countries already control short-term interest rates  by varying the interest rate paid on
balances held with the centra1 bank, rather than by injecting or absorbing liquidity in such an amount as
to induce a desired differential between that interest rate and the ovemight rate.  In a world in which there
exist (perfect) substitutes for bank reserves, only a zero differential is compatible with a positive demand
for base money, and conducting a monetary tightening by trying to increase the spread would result in a
complete substitution away from reserves towards the higher-yielding privately issued liquid  assets
(Woodford, 2000). Instead, the centra1 bank can steer short-tetm  market rates  in a direction it desires by
bringing about changes in the interest rate  paid on base money. That is, for a tightening the centra1 bank
raises the nomina1 return on base money, which by virtue of arbitrage and the perfect substitutability
characteristic also raises the nomina1 return on non-monetary assets  to an extent that is consistent with
price stability (Woodford, 2000; Hall, 1999). As the choice of the nomina1 rate of interest on centra1
bank liabilities is an arbitrary choice of the central bank, this instrument is always available. The only
requirement is that the liabilities of the centra1 bank are always accepted.  Goodhart (2000) however
makes the qualification  that the changes in the rates  paid on base money must be brought about by
selling  or buying existing centra1 bank assets.  which wil1 imply a reduction of central bank profits (or
an increase in central banks tighten by the selling of assets  out  of their portfolio at
a lower price (higher return) than their competitors. and loosen by buying assets  in exchange for base
money at a higher asset  price.  He does not find this a major problem, because of the non-profít-
maximising behaviour of the central bank as a public institution (see also Goodhart, 1985, 1988).
However, this could have consequences for the (financial) independente  of the centra1 bank.
*’ In ‘conventional’ monetary exchange systems the basis medium of exchange (commodity money or fiat money)
invariably has served as the unit of account. In a moneyless world, there is no longer a tangible medium of exchange,
and so the choice (and even the number) of the unit of account becomes less obvious, see Fama  (1980, 1983).
” In such  an economy, the demand for base money would, in the absente  of remuneration of reserves, equal  zero
(Woodford, 2OOO).Clearly,  in the absente  of demand, varying the supply (either by announcing a quantity or a
willingness  to supply at a certain interest rate) will be ineffective in influencing the ovemight rate.
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So, even in an economy in which ‘high-powered money’ has lost its power, the centra1 bank wil1
be able to steer the ovemight rate.  There remains however the question of the role to be played by centra1
banks in such  a world described by, for example, Black (1970),  as the traditional functions of money wil1
be performed by an infinite  number of altemative instruments, which can al1 be expressed in terms of
each other (Fama, 1980; Goodhart, 1989). In that world, monetary policy, that is the maintenance of a
constant purchasing power of the unit of account, has no meaning because there wil1 be a number of
units of account (Issing, 2000). However, if society were to express a preferente  for a particular unit of
account, in which al1 altemative instruments would be priced, then it would stil1 be possible for the
centra1 bank to regulate the value of this unit of account, as was discussed above.21  Note that in such a
world the need to limit excessive money creation is replaced by a concern to ensure the integrity of the
computer systems used for settlement. Centra1 banks could be seen as a natura1 candidate  for such a
supervisory activity.
It is very  unlikely that this utopian world wil1 ever become reality. In any case, such a world
would probably be preceded by an economy where  centra1 banks face a reduced demand for settlement
balances and competitors challenge the position of the centra1 bank in this market. It follows from the
discussion above that in this situation, a centra1 bank can continue to influence the tost  of flnance.  It can
do so by changing its instrument variable, either by choice of economie agents (by offering to
lend/borrow unlimited amounts of its liabilities at a (risk adjusted) price which is by definition the most
attractive)  or by regulation. The latter  could be realised by requiring taxes to be paid in centra1 bank
liabilities (Friedrnan, 2OOOa,b). An altemative would be to ensure that the centra1 bank remains the only
entity which is allowed to corner the market for settlement balances by forcing participants to lend or
borrow from its facilities at the rates  it chooses to impose on the market. For a description of such a
system, see Henckel et al. (1999). By being the uncontested broker in the case of settlement diffculties,  a
centra1 bank acquires an unique disciplinating capacity which bolsters the credibility of its interest rate
announcements and ensures that no private broker takes its place.
Thefinctioning  of credit markets  and the new economy
The leve1 of short-term  market interest rates  affects  only a proportion of the financing of expenditure of
households and farms. The private sector also finances part of its spending at longer-term rates  on the
capita1 market as wel1 as through fïnancial intermediaries (and through other means  like retentions and
equity issues). The tost  of borrowing from these sources is only indirectly influenced by the current leve!
of money market rates.  Important determinants of the impact of changes  in the instrument variable (the
ovemight rate)  on the tost  of finance thus include the substitutability between different forms of fïnance.
the pass-through of changes in market interest rates  to bank lending and deposit rates  and the impact of
” Such  a preferente  is likely, since an unique numeraire is an efficient  solution to the co-ordination  problems involved
in negotiating contracts  and performing economie calculations, see White (1984) and Issing (1999).
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changes in short-term interest rates  on long-term interest rates.  These determinants wil1 likely be affected
by the factors  associated with the new economy.
The substitutability between different forms of finance and the responses to market rates  of
lending charges applied by financial institutions is to an important extent dependent on the functioning of
credit markets.  The new economy is believed to bring closer a neo-classical financial environment
without frictions and asymmetrie  information, that is, a world in which the Modigliani-Miller  (1958)
theorem holds.  In this world, agents in the private sector can, at market interest rates,  borrow and lend
whatever amounts are necessary to achieve their desired spending pattems. The absente  of information
imperfections between suppliers and users of funds implies that the substitutability between intemal and
extemal financing sources and between different forms of extemal finance, such as intermediated and
non-intermediated credit, is perfect (BIS, 1994). If bank assets  and liabilities have identical
characteristics to other borrowing and saving instruments.  such as bonds,  then bank and non-bank
instruments wil1 trade at the same price (assuming risk neutrality). The pass-through from market interest
rates  to bank rates  is immediate and complete (Dale and Haldane. 1993). Financial prices  in this perfect
capita1 market allocate  financial quantities optimally. Interactions between financial variables and non-
fïnancial activity can be reduced and simplified to interactions between interest rates  and non-financial
activity.23  The main implication would therefore be that, to the extent that information asymmetries and
the crucial role of financial intermediaries wil1 be diminished by the new economy, there wil1 be an
enhanced role for direct finance with a larger role of private debt securities and equity markets.= In such
an environment, interest rate  changes may impact on the corporate sector more quickly as fmancial
market prices  tend to react  more quickly to changes in official rates  than retail deposit and lending rates.
Thus.  monetary policy actions may almost instantaneously affect corporate bond yields and equity
prices.  affecting the tost of direct borrowing, while the impact of official rates  on lending rates  is
currently less immediate. Also, the more competitive  fmancial markets,  the greater the inclination of
tïnancial intermediaries to adjust their interest rate  spreads more promptly and significantly in response
to changes in official rates  (Mojon, 20).
Nou-price component of tost  offinance
However, since the seminal paper by Akerlof  (1970) it is well-known  that the efficient functioning of the
market for credit is hindered by asymmetries in information between borrowers and lenders, resulting in
principal-agent problems (Oliner and Rudebusch. 1996). These problems lead to endogenous and
varying credit conditions which help to shape the transmission of monetary policy decisions through the
economy, see Stiglitz and Weiss (198 l), Bemanke (1983),  Bemanke and Blinder (1988). As recognised
by, inter  alia, Kashyap, Stein and Wilcox (1993). Kashyap and Stein (1994) and Hubbard (1994) this
” As emphasized by Meltzer  (1995. 2001). this equilibrium determines not a single interest rate,  but a vector of rates,
representing the yields on bonds,  equity and other assets.
24  Allen and Santomero (2001) argue  that financial intermediaries maintain their crucial  role in the financial system
despite the reduction in information asymmetries, by swiching from their traditional business to free-producing
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uncertainty generates a potential important role for fïnancial intermediaries which specialise  in gathering
and distilling agent-specific information. The implication is that fïnancial intermediairies, usually banks,
play a unique role in the monetary transmission process,  acting as an interface between the policy
decisions of the centra1 bank and non-financial activity. Decisions of
financial institutions regarding the size of their balance sheets and the yields paid on their assets  and
liabilities play an active role in the transmission of monetary pohcies. Because financial institutions
obtain a portion of their funds from instruments subject to reserve requirements, open market operations,
which alter the quantity of reserves, may affect the opportunity tost  of funds to those institutions beyond
their impact on market interest rates.  That is, fmancial quantities (the availability of credit) play an
important role in this credit view of the transmission mechanism.25
The new economy, and the revolution in ICT in particular, increases the amount of information
which is available to a greater number of economie agents at an increasingly lower tost. If the increased
availability of information reduces the prevalente  of information asymmetries, it also implies a reduced
role of depository intermediaries in advancing credit to the non-financial economy, as their traditional
comparative  advantage, information intermediation. erodes.  see Allen and Santomero (1998). This
disintermediation wil1 result in a further proliferation of nonbank credit (Friedman, 1999). However, the
extent to which the importante  of the credit view of monetary transmission wil1 be eroded by the new
economy remains an open question. As a genera1 remark,  increased availabihty of information does not
necessarily imply increased access  to information.26 And the theoretical basis for the credit Channel, the
theory of asymmetrie  information (Akerlof, 1970),  stresses  that these asymmetries arise because there
exist economie agents who  benefit  from not disclosing their information to others (and that other agents
know this). It  is not likely that this behaviour wil1 change with new ICT (Browne and Cronin, 1997).
However, even with a significant part of agents in the economy remaining ‘bank dependent’ because of
continuing information asymmetries, the new economy could have an impact on the role played by
fïnancial intermediaries in the transmission mechanism.”  To see this, note that innovations on financial
markets  have now advanced to the point where  the bank that investigates the borrower’s
creditworthiness, originates the loan and services the credit relationship, no longer needs to hold the laan
in its own portfolio. Instead, bank loans are often  sold to (nonfïnancial)  fïrms  that package them into
aggregated portfolios of similar credits,  which in turn stand as collateral behind securities owned and
traded by market investors, as wel1 as households who  buy these securities directly on their own account.
New financial products  such as derivatives are used by these agents (either directly or indirectly, via
activities based on risk managemant skills  using derivatives.
‘5  Note that, in addition to the  effects  described in a previous section,  a declining importante  of reserve requirements
and open market operations wil1  also  impact on the transmission mechanism  by weakening the credit Channel.
26  See Herings and Schinkel (2000) for a more general  discussion of the limitations to the diffusion of ICT.
” Some also  argue that the dominant mode of financial intermediation will change due to new economy-related
developments (disintermediation and securitisation in particular).The  traditional ‘par-value’ banking system, in which
both the deposits and loans are redeemable at par. will in this view be replaced by a ‘mutual fund banking’system. In
the latter  all  assets and liabilities are traded on secondary markets  and thereby carry varying values (Fama.1980,  1983;
Goodhart, 1988; Browne and Fell. 1994). For a critical review, see Goodhart (1986, 1993).
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financial intermediaries) to manage the risks incurred by these investments. Securitisation weakens the
influence of centra1 banks on the transmission process  to the extent that it severs the bank-oriented
component of the credit expansion from any direct relation to the centra1 bank’s system of required
reserves, see Thomton (1994). Mishkin (1996),  Friedman (1999) and Estrella (2001). The
transfotmation of non-marketed bank loans into marketable securities thus reduces the role of the credit
view even when  bank dependency continues, see Chami et al. (1999) and Fender (2OOOa,  b). D Edwards
and Mishkin (1995) provide some empirical evidente  of this weakening.
Term structure
The responses of longer-term interest rates  to movements in short-term rates  are easiest explained under
the paradigm of perfect capita1 markets,  as discussed  above. If al1 financial assets  (monetary or non-
monetary) are perfect substitutes, there exists only one relative asset  price,  ‘the’ interest rate. The
differente  between the short-term interest rate  and the long-term interest rate,  or, more generally,
changes in market interest rates  along the maturity spectrum, wil1 reflect fully the current leve1 and
expected future path of short-term interest rates.  This is the so-called expectations theory of the term
structure (Modigliani and Shiller, 1973),  a theory that currently receives little  empirical support (Berk,
2001). This should not come  as a surprise, as capita1 markets  are not perfect, fïnancial market
participants are not risk-neutral and consequently the differences between interest rates  of different
maturity wil1 not only reflect expectations of future changes  in short-term rates,  but also risk premia. But
to the extent that the factors  usually identified with a new economy (section  2 above) work in the
direction of a move towards perfect capita1 markets,  and the pervasive possibilities for insuring and
sharing risk using new financial instruments diminish the importante  of risk premia (Shiller, 1993),  the
expectations theory of the yield curve should fare  better in a new economy.  The latter  should not taken
to imply that risk premia wil1 disappear completely and immediately. However, the new economy wil1
tend to reduce and in the limit eliminate imperfections such as transaction costs,  brokerage margins
between borrowing and lending rates,  restrictions on short  sales, differential tax considerations, etc. In
addition, the use of securitised claims for payments might also ease credit risks, as those claims would
be marked-to-market on an ongoing basis and would be transferable in real time. The ensuing increase
in portfolio diversification possibilities reduces price discrepancies between assets.  Finally, it can not
be excluded that the advent of derivatives in the management of risk by economie  agents wil1 change
their attitude towards risk, perhaps more into the direction of
ra  There seem however  to be limits to the extent of securitisation, to the extent that certain assets, notably those which do
not have a sufficient amount or quality of collateral,  remain uncettain.  This uncertainty in turn is a cause  of the preferente
for convertability into ‘safe’ base money. Proponents of the narrow  banking  movement (Fama, 1980) try to remedy this
uncertainty, see Goodhart (1989, 1993) for details. Note that the advent of corporate risk management stratepies.
making use of new financial products  such  as derivatives, tend to reduce  the limits that are trsditionally  placed  on the
proces of securitisation. See Goodhart (1989, p. 120-121).  For a further, and interesting, generalisation of implications
of risk sharing,  see Shiller (1993).
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risk neutrality, see Cape1 and Jansen (2001). This al1 points towards an increased substitutability of
assets across  the maturity spectrum (Vrolijk, 1997). The result would be a faster transmission of
monetary policy signals along the yield curve.Moreover, by the leverage inherent in the use of
derivatives this transmission would also be stronger.
5 The influence of changes in the tost  of fïnance on non-financial activity
The impact of changes in the tost  of finance (which includes quantity as wel1 as price-related variables)
on non-financial activity depends on various factors  (Bank of England,  1990). First, changes in the tost
of fïnance induce a substitution between saving and borrowing, as economie  agents intertemporally
smooth expenditure. Moreover, investment decisions are re-asessed in the light of changed costs  of
capital,  as the latter  affect the opportunity tost  of real expenditure decisions. This substitution effect
mainly influences new borrowing decisions. The direction of this effect is always negative, ie a rise in
the tost  of finance decreases non-financial activity, and the extent of the impact wil1 depend on the
ability of agents to substitute intertemporally. Deregulation and globalisation of financial markets,
improvements in ICT as wel1 as advances in risk management techniques and related instruments
(derivatives), increasingly enable risks to be traded on financial markets  and provide insurance. The new
economy therefore improves the intertemporal substitution of income streams (Shiller,  1993). This
should work against the substitution effect of monetary transmission. It is, for example, possible to hedge
against the adverse impact of the substitution effect: by using structured  derivatives such as options on
futures, a hedger can lock in the current interest rate  for potential future funding needs.  The new
economy thereby pushes economies towards a more classical-looking world, in which expenditure
decisions are determined to a larger extent by expected wealth and relative prices.  In this frictionless
world it is the real interest rate that matters, because economie agents wil1 typically base their decisions
on a comparison between what they consume today and what they hope to consume in the future.”
Moreover, current income (ie the fraction  of wealth which is generated in the current period) should
become less important a determinant of current consumption. Net worth would gradually replace cash
flow as the primary influence on investment expenditures. There is some empirical evidente  to support
this position (see Browne and Fell, 1994, for an overview), but it is stil1 far from conclusive whether the
substitution effect of monetary transmisson wil1 become weaker.  This is mainly because there will
remain uncertainties which are not hedgeable. Moreover, hedging comes  at a tost (through the option
premium for example), which may prove to be prohibitive for some (especially small) economie agents.
Second,  changes in the tost of finance lead to changes in average rates  on outstanding contracts.
modifying incomes and cash flows and hence constraints on spending. This income  effect mainly
impacts on outstanding borrowing. Its main influence is on agents’ liquidity, and its direction depends on
the net holdings of assets  and liabilities. A net saver receives a positive income  effect following an
29  If the new economy increases profïtable investment opportunities, then the real  interest rate  must increase in order to
entourage  households to save more to fïnance the higher leve1  of investment.
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increase in the tost  of fïnance,  whereas a net borrower has a negative income effect. The rise thus
redistributes income from borrowers to lenders. In practice,  the standard life-cycle pattem of
employment followed by retirement wil1 lead those obtaining income from labour to be, on balance, net
savers. In contrast, the productive investing sector is by nature a net borrower, since it has to issue
financial liabilities on itself to purchase the real assets  which wil1 subsequently provide the returns to
meet the debt obligations. If borrowers have a higher marginal propensity to consume than lenders, then
the aggregate income effect is negative. As discussed above, the new economy provides increased
insurance possibilities. This is particularly relevant for the income effect of monetary transmission, as
derivatives significantly  increase the ability of economie agents to hedge the income effect associated
with fluctuations in the tost  of finance. Hedged agents are either more sensitive to the tost  of finance,  or
more risk averse than agents who  end up holding risk. Hedgers could be willing to carry the tost  of
hedging because they have a higher  marginal propensity to consume, and therefore wish to maintain their
high consumption (Vrolijk, 1997). Derivatives allow these agents to hedge their exposure to payments
and receipts which are sensitive to the tost  of finance.  It can be argued that the size of the income effect
wil1 be reduced due to new-economy induced increased insurance possibilities. Consider that for the
duration of the hedge, the complete income effect has been shifted from the hedged agents to the risk
holding agents. The hedged agents are not prone to an income effect, whereas the risk holders receive a
double income effect. But since it is likely  that the risk holders’ propensity to consume is lower than that
of the hedgers, the income effect is not as negative as if the hedgers had not been hedged. This line of
reasoning demonstrates that, for every hedged unit, a risk holder must have acquired the risk, that is,
hedging is (in a closed economy) a macroeconomic zero-sum game.30 There are thus always some
economie agents which are confronted with an income effect. The actual change in the income effect
element of the transmission mechanism lies in the differente  between the marginal propensities to
consume of the hedger and the risk holder. Moreover, and this also applies to the preceding analysis of
the substitution effect, the new economy related factors  also work in the direction of a faster  transmission
of monetary policy to asset  prices  (as their substitutability increases). This implies that (hedged as wel1
as unhedged) economie agents are impacted by a substitution and income effect sooner. That is, both
effects  may impact earlier, but are smaller in magnitude.
Third. changes  in the tost of fínance affect the value of certain assets,  such as housing, equities
or govemment bonds.  These values, in turn, have an impact on wealth perceptions. which influence
spending (Bank of England, 1999). Moreover, this so-called wealth effect influences the ability to
borrow and the willingness to lend. As wealth is equal to discounted future net income, its effect in the
chain of monetary transmission in principle is closely related to the income effect. There are two ways
through which wealth can vary: through changes  in income flows and through changes  in the discount
3o  However,  to the  extent that the new economy influences risk trading  in such a way that risk ends up with economie
agents and institutions most willing and able  to bear risk, it improves efficiency. On the other hand, it also  has the
p,otential  to shift the non-diversifiable risk in the economy to the imprudent (Buiter. 2000).
Hedgers remove the need for precautionary saving, thereby increasing their propensity to consume. There is some.
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factor. As the former effect is discussed above, we wil1 focus here on a change in net worth due to a
change in prices, see also Mishkin (1996). A reduction in prices of, for example, bonds,  equity and real
estate, causes  a decline in wealth, which, according to the life cycle consumption model (Modigliani,
1971),  induces a reduction in non-financial activity. Again, hedging techniques similar  to those used for
hedging an adverse income effect, tend to reduce the size of the wealth effect. However, since hedging in
order to maintain market value of assets  currently is less common than using derivatives for earnings or
cash flow management (Bodnar  and Marston, 1996),  its size is probably smal1 relative to hedging against
adverse income effects.  This is in particular  the case for changes in the price of real estate, for which the
hedging possibilities are fairly limited, due to the relatively illiquid  character of the market for real
estate. Finally,  to the extent that households and firms  are likely to increase the share of securitised
fmancial assets  in their portfolios, the wealth effect may gain in importante.
A final factor through which changes in monetary policy instruments influence non-financial
activity operates through the exchange rate (Menon, 1995). Under flexible exchange rates,  a higher tost
of finance due to an interest rate increase attracts foreign capita],  thereby appreciating the exchange rate.
The higher exchange rate makes domestic’goods relatively more expensive than foreign goods,
decreasing net experts and (domestic) non-financial activity. Derivatives have the potential to
significantly  reduce the impact of this transmission Channel, to the extent that both wholesale  importers
and exporters use currency derivatives to hedge nomina1  exchange rate fluctuations in the short run.
Indeed,  currency derivatives figure prominently in surveys  of derivatives markets  (Bodnar  and Marston,
1996; BIS, 1996b). However, changes  in the tost  of finance also induce changes in the real exchange
rate,  and these are more difficult  to hedge, especially when  the driving force behind the fluctuations are
changes  in the relative price level. In this case there is a substitution effect which is not insurable; agents
are faced  with the situation in which one country is relatively more reasonable for future investment or
consumption flows. An altemative aspect of the exchange rate  Channel is that of interest rate  parity,
which transmits domestic policy abroad, and foreign policy home. It can be argued that the arrival of
large-scale over-the-counter currency markets  increases the strength of the covered  interest rate  parity
relationship. Moreover, through the link from derivative markets  to spot markets,  it wil1 ultimately
strengthen the uncovered interest rate  parity relationship (see in this respect Berk and Knot. 2001). The
implication is an increased intemational interdependency of interest rates,  and greater intemational
capita1 flows following policy changes  that change interest rates.  Or, to put it differently, derivatives
allow zero-risk arbitrage portfolios to be set up, forcing harmonisation of the relationship between
exchange rates,  foreign and domestic interest rates. Monetary policy inconsistent with domestic
fundamentals or with foreign interest rates  (or with the pegged exchange rate)  will cause  strong capita1
flows. Some of the counterparts of exchange rate  derivative contracts.  that is the agents who  take over
the risk from exporters or importers who  want to insure themselves against exchange rate  fluctuations.
wil1 be abroad. The total impact on domestic non-fïnancial activity of a change in the exchange rate
albeit limited, empirical evidente supporting this (McCarthy, 1995)
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induced by a change in the tost  of finance wil1 therefore be reduced, but the reverse also holds.  That is,
foreign monetary policy can affect the domestic economy through foreign risk held domestically.
To the extent that the new economy, via globalisation of trade, leads to an increased openness of
an economy to trade in goods and services, the exchange rate Channel  of monetary transmission wil1
increase in importante.  This exchange rate Channel  touches upon the broader aspect of the effect of the
new economy on intemational interdependence of monetary transmission mechanisms.  Rapid advances
in ICT not only have brought many more investors into the intemational markets,  but also have created a
much  greater degree of coherente  in the attitudes and portfolio behaviour of investors who  remain
physically dispersed (Friedman, 1999). As financial globalisation advances, more and more centra1
banks wil1 find that attempts to control their short-term interest rates  in a policy vacuum,  that is, without
regard for intemational economie developments, wil1 not generate the desired domestic effects.
In sum, it is likely that in a new economie environment changes in the tost  of finance wil1 affect
non-financial activity sooner, but the total impact wil1 be less as more economie agents wil1 be able to
isolate themselves from these changes.  Moreover, the mechanism of monetary transmission wil1 be
increasingly intemational.
6 The snlit between inflation and economie mowth
Our previous discussion showed that, because of real rigidities in the form of credit market
imperfections, monetary policy can influence non-financial activity not (only) through interest rates
but (also) through the availability of credit. In addition, the extent to which changes in non-financial
activity generated by changes  in the instrument variables translates into changes in prices and output,
respectively, depends largely on the behaviour of wage and price setters. In general,  the greater the
degree of nomina1 wage and price flexibility, the more changes in non-financial activity affect prices
and not output. Wage and price behaviour, in turn, is influenced by inflation expectations as wel1 as by
institutional factors.  The introduction of the rational expectations hypothesis (Muth, 1961),  to
macroeconomics by Lucas (1972). Sargent (1976) and Sargent and Wallace (1975),  led to
expectational effects  being explained in terms of concepts  such as credibility and reputation of the
policy maker. The institutional framework in which this interaction between the policy maker and the
private sector takes place stresses  factors  which inhibit the continuous clearing of markets.  Rational
expectations are thus compatible with non-market clearing due to various (institutional) barriers to
rapid adjustment of prices and wages (Fischer, 1977; Blinder, 1991; Bah and Mankiw, 1994). The
most notable explanations as regards the causes  of these rigidities include legal and institutional
barriers to price adjustments (such  as rent controls)  and monopolistic or oligopolistic competition in
product markets (Gordon, 1990; Mankiw and Romer, 1991). But also in a competitive  environment,
price inertia  may result  from the existente  of menu costs  in changing prices  or from a desire by fïrms
not to damage long-term relationships with clients by frequent variations in prices.  As regards wage
rigidities, explanations also focus on factors  hindering competition, such as regulatory impediments to
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wage adjustments (e.g. minimum wages), the influence of unions and generous unemployment benefit
schemes.32 On the other hand, even where competition is fierce but information is distributed
asymmetrically, there may be a desire of both firms and workers to have longer-term working
relationships entailing an implicit  insurance against excessive  wage volatility, or firms may refrain
from downward wage adjustments in order not to jeopardise employee motivation and labour
productivity. Moreover, from the hysteresis literature (Cross, 19SS),  wage rigidities causing
unemployment persistente  are explained with insider-outsider and duration theories of the wage
bargaining process.
It follows that the behaviour of markets wil1 be an important factor in determining how  and
with what speed a change in the tost  of finance is spills over into economie  growth (ie quantities) or
inflation (prices), see in this respect also Cavelaars (2001). In discussing the effects of the new
economy on the functioning of markets, we wil1 mainly restrict ourselves to the availability and access
to information.33 In that respect, a useful distinction can be made between goods information and
information goods, see Hirschleifer and Riley (1995). The former have no intrinsic value; they relate
to information about products, and aim at (and derive their value from) improving the decisions made
by economie  agents.34 The conclusion that the more widespread use of ICT brings the economy more
to the textbook model of perfect competition is mainly due to the likelihood of a more comprehensive
and cheaper exchange of goods information, to such a extent that al1 the goods information ultimately
becomes incorporated in the prices of goods. In general,  the diffusion of ICT allows for a more
efficient  processing of information which (by reducing search costs)  lowers transaction costs.
Moreover, by further enhancing an integrated approach in which information systems of various
participants  within the supply chain are interlinked (so-called connectivity), productivity growth is
increased, see for example Meijers (2000)  Sijben (2000).35  This improves the functioning of markets
in that agents are in a better position to tïnd a solution to the ‘signal processing problem’ (Lucas,
1977). The latter  relates to the issue of determining whether observed movements in prices reflect a
shift in the genera1 price leve1 or in relative prices,  and are permanent or transitory.36  The solution to
this problem wil1 determine whether economie agents change their spending decisions, which wil1 in
” For recent discussions of rigidities in the labour market, see Akerlof,  Dickens and Perry (1996, 2000).
33  Other factors  that are likely to play a role  in this respect, partly touched upon in previous sections, include financial
market liberalisation and globalisation, and trade liberalisation, which can  increase the degree of competition,
productivity growth, and (by de-materialising output) reduce  transportation costs.  Moreover, more prudent fiscal
policy has the potential to significantly reduce  market distortions by containing crowding-out  effects, and  the succesful
pursuit of price  stability improves the working of the relative  price  mechanism,  leading to more efficient  resource
allocation.
34  This of course does not imply that goods information cannot be traded in markets.  as the real-life  example of real
estate agents shows.
35  More and cheaper access  to information also  improves the functioning of the labour market, by making the matching
rocess
P,
more efficient  and reducing frictional unemployment.
The ensuing improvement in the co-ordinating  capabilities of modem decentralised market economies  is illustrated
by the more optimal use of inventories. This, in turn, may help to dampen busines cycle fluctuations, see McConnell  et
al. (2000)
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turn determine whether real variables wil1 change.37 In an utopian new economy world with goods and
goods information al1 information asymmetries wil1 be eliminated, and the Walrasian auctioneer wil1
determine equilibrium relative prices.38 In general,  though, before this world becomes reality,
fluctuations in the tost  of finance wil1 elicit relatively quicker  price adjustments, with less effect on
quantities.39
Information goods (goods that can be represented in digital form) on the other hand are an end
in themselves, ie they directly enter into production or utility functions. Examples of information
goods used in production include word processors and databases, whereas consumers derive utility
from information goods mainly from their entertainment value. The production and distribution of
information goods are characterised by the public good properties of non-rivalness and non-
excludability (Arrow, 1962). This implies that the advent of information goods in the economy is not a
move towards the classica1 textbook model of perfect competition, in which an infinite  number of
smal1 price-taking entities compete. Instead, competition in this world is more akin to the
Schumpeterian concept.40 Increased returns to scale on the supply side on the market for information
goods tend to interact with network effects  on the demand side to create powerful incentives for
natura1  monopolies. This results in a market structure  characterised by a smal1 number of large price-
setting entities. Profit  maximisation by a traditional monopolist implies restricting supply and rising
the price, leading to higher  prices than in the conventional competitive  paradigm. Monopolies in the
market for information goods may however  prove less harmful, as the pressure of technological
change elicits a dynamism which wil1 ensure that there exists a rivalry between altemating or
succeeding monopolies, ie contestability is always possible.4’ The result  wil1 be that firms operating in
the market for information goods wil1 compete by lowering the price and increase output (Shapiro and
Varian, 1999).
If the weight of information goods in a new economie  environment is relatively small,  chances
are that the economy will move towards the traditional classica1 paradigm, with the concomitant
behaviour of markets and the consequences for the passthrough of changes in the tost of finance to
prices and quantities (that is prices adjust quickly, with limited effects  on quantities). If, on the other
hand, this new economy wil1 be dominated by information goods, this wil1 imply a change in relative
prices as resources are re-allocated towards these information goods. The general price leve1 should be
37  A purely transitory change in the relative price wil1  not elicit a change in behaviour, and nor will a change in the
eneral
5
price level. See Lucas (1977) for a forma1  exposition.
Supplemented by a fully  frictionless financial world the general  price leve1  would be meaningless, as would be
monetary policy. However, if society were to express a preferente  for a single unit of account, its value could be
regulated by a central  bank, and there wil1  exist an equilibrium leve1  of money prices  (Woodford, 1998). See section  4.
39  This wil1  lead to permanent effects  on equilibrium price and output levels,  with transistory effects  on economie
gowth  and inflation. For similar arguments, see for example Herings and Schinkel (2000).
Note the interaction of the various forces  associated with the new economy. In particular. the deepening and
development of financial markets  discussed  above tends  to improve especially the growth prospects  of young, dynamic
and innovative firms, that is the type of firms that contribute mostly to the waves  of creative  destruction.
4’  In addition, the durable character of information goods will act as a catalyst for competition, see Herings and
Schinkel (2000). The key issue for competition policy in the new economy therefore is not market share, but the abuse
of market power by a dominant fírm  to discourage innovation by others.
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less affected,  and wil1 continue to be determined by monetary factors,  especially in the long run
(Lucas, 1977). The macro-economic effect of the advent of the new economy in terms of functioning
of markets is therefore not clear-cut. The same applies for its effect on inflation and growth (Buiter,
2000). Investigating the implications of phenomena often associated with the new economy, such  as
lower profit  margins, a lower NAIRU, a higher  trend productivity growth, on inflation and output, in
the short as wel1 as in the longer  run, requires the specification  of a model. The theoretical basis for
such  a model is available, even for an economy dominated by information goods (see, for example,
Meijers, 2000). So, just as the new economy is, in fact,  not new, its effects can and should be
discussed using readily available, that is existing, economie  theory.
7 Concludinp.  remarks
The new economy is generally interpreted as a supply-side  phenomenon, driven by technological
advances  and structural changes, which, partly via more flexible and efficient  labour, product and
capita1 markets and increased competition, over time lead to a higher  leve1 and growth rate of potential
output. Regarding the financial system, the new economy might also be associated with a tendency
towards disintermediation, securitisation, the emergence of new fïnancial instruments and increased
financial wealth.
We have discussed how  monetary policy transmission would look like in this new economie
environment. Our most genera1 conclusion is that monetary policy wil1 be possible. It seems unlikely
that new economy-induced developments would ever severe1.y limit the possibility of centra1 banks
steering the ovemight rate.  Of course, methods for exercising this influence wil1 have to be adapted to
the new economie  environment. but that is nothing new for centra1 banks. As long as there remains some
residual demand for base money, and there is every reason to expect that this wil1 be the case, these
changes wil1 not have significant consequences. Even in the unlikely event that there are perfect
substitutes for base money, the centra1 bank wil1 stil1  be able to steer interest rates.  However, it wil1
probably require govemment backing, in the form of regulation that changes  the structure  of the fmancial
system, or to financially  support the centra1 bank. By steering its ‘nucleus’, the ovemight rate.  the
central bank is stil1 able to anchor the term structure,  and this interest rate Channel  of monetary
transmission wil1 gain in importante  in a new economy. The speed by which this anchoring occurs
increases, as wil1 the speed at which changes in the tost of finance wil1 affect non-fïnancial activity.
The impact of the latter  will,  however,  be less.
Although not directly addressed previously, we would also like to argue that there remains a
need for monetary policy in a new economy. Stories about the ‘death of inflation’ (Browne and Fell.
1994) are not firmly based on economie arguments. Even in the unlikely case in which the new
economy would closely resemble the perfect competition paradigm, this would mean a better
functioning of the price mechanism. that is of relative prices.  This suggests that monetary policy
actions wil1 elicit primarily reactions in prices,  with relatively less effects on quantities. Movements in
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the genera1 price leve1 wil1 stil1 occur, and there wil1 remain a need for an authority entrusted with
maintaining the stability of this price level. Monetary policy as we currently understand wil1 be
meaningless only in a utopian, fully  frictionless, world because the latter  has no genera1 price level.
However,  it seems likely that even in this world there would be a single unit of account, the value of
which can be regulated by a centra1 bank.
Our discussion points to a number of policy relevant questions that warrant future research.
The fust is to provide the qualitative analysis presented here with quantitative underpinnings,
investigating the relative importante  of the effects of the new economy on the various transmission
channels. Secondly, having discussed how  the new economy changes  the way monetary policy affects
the economy, the policy maker is confronted with the natura1 follow-up question, that is how  to
conduct monetary policy in a new economy. This touches on issues as the permanent or transitory
character of accelerations in productivity or real output growth, and whether this is accompanied by a
permanent or transitory decline in the inflation rate.  Providing answers to these questions would
require a rigorous  modelling effort (see in this respect Buiter,  2000) and lies beyond the scope of this
paper. However,  our analysis suggests that caution is warranted in interpreting new economy effects
on inflation rates and economie  growth as permanent. The new economy will, in the end, imply a shift
in and better signalling properties of relative prices.  After completing this relative price adjustment,
the equilibrium price leve1 wil1 probably be lower, but the persistente  of the effects on the inflation
rate are murky, at best. Confronted with the uncertainty that prevails surrounding these issues, another
relevant question for policy makers would be whether to conduct policy in a gradual or more
aggressive fashion, that is should the central bank follow a policy of interest rate smoothing or
stepping?
In the end, the new economy is not new. and the same holds for the toolkit needed for
analysing its implications, as wel1 as for the questions that confront the monetary policy maker
operating in a new economie  environment. The ‘old’ central banks therefore seem to have lost nothing
of their relevante.
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